By Pinhas Inbari
Last week’s meeting of Israeli and Palestinian negotiators Yitzhak Molkho and Saeb Erekat in Amman was perceived as a resumption of direct negotiations toward a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The meeting resulted out of intensive Jordanian mediation efforts within the framework of the latest Quartet resolution to resume direct negotiations between the sides without preconditions. Both parties were required to submit their positions on the issues of final borders and security. While the session in Amman appeared like direct negotiations that satisfied Israel, it was actually a series of meetings within the Quartet forum and in the presence of Jordanian foreign minister, Nasser Jodah.
Both the Palestinians and the Israelis arrived at the negotiations table with a set of principles. The Palestinians demands include an independent state along the 1967 lines, as delineated in their application for statehood at the United Nations in September. They also demand total Israeli evacuation from the West Bank and reliance on Palestinian and international forces to establish security. This is unacceptable to Israel, who will only rely on the IDF to secure its borders, and demands to keep its forces along the Jordan River.
It has also refused to discuss any maps of the future settlement prior to the resolution of these security issues. The London-based Arabic daily Al-Quds al-Arabi reported that Israel was not ready to withdraw from all settlements in the West Bank, and is therefore ready to withdraw from some parts of the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem.
If the report is correct, it would indicate that the negotiation process will continue as both sides have already made some concessions: the Palestinians no longer demand that Israel halt all settlement construction before resuming negotiations, while Israel has shown it is ready to evacuate some Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and settlements in the West Bank.
While the negotiating parties’ positions remain wide apart, both are interested in maintaining the negotiating process due to the unattractive nature of the alternative. The Palestinians declared that in case the negotiations option is exhausted and the UN bid for statehood comes to naught, they would consider every other option, including launching a popular Intifada or dragging Israel through international tribunals and UN forums to smear its name.
The first option is already agreed upon with Hamas, while the other is going through serious planning stages in Ramallah. Both options are problematic for the PLO. The Palestinian citizens are extremely reluctant to launch another intifada, while the United States would not allow the PLO to launch an international slander campaign against Israel. Accordingly, the negotiation process provides a much needed reprieve from having to choose between these two options. Israel, of course, is happy to provide the PLO with the negotiations fig leaf in order to avoid either of the alternatives. It also hopes, along with leading factors within Fatah and the West, that the negotiations will put an end to the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation process.
The other party interested in keeping the negotiations alive is the Kingdom of Jordan. Jordan is extremely worried that the failure of the negotiations would raise the specter of a bi-national Palestinian-Israeli state or an alternative state for the Palestinians in Jordan. With King Abdullah II scheduled to visit Washington in two weeks, it is vital that he not only to establish a leading role as person of influence in the region, but also possess something to convince President Obama not to abandon the peace process based on the two states solution.
Jordan also hopes that the negotiations will circumvent the possibility of a popular intifada among the Palestinians in Jordan, who have so far limited their protests to quiet marches to the Jordan Valley border.
The real test of the negotiations will come after 26 January, when the Quartet’s call for direct talks expires. Whereas Israel is interested in continuing to negotiate beyond that date, the PLO may reconsider the negotiations track if it sees that the international slander campaign against Israel might have traction and appeal.
