Abbas versus Dahlan: Why all the ferocity?
By Pinhas Inbari
There exists an on-going rivalry between the leader of the PLO, Mahmoud Abbas, and a young senior Fatah member from Gaza, Muhammad Dahlan. Last weekend, the struggle between the two reached a peak, when Palestinian Authority security raided Dahlan's house in Ramallah, arrested his bodyguards, and confiscated his cars and computers. Dahlan returned to Ramallah after a relatively long period of time which he spent abroad so as to avoid an open clash with Abbas. Nevertheless, he decided to return in order to appear before the "investigation committee" that is looking into a long list of accusations starting with past assassinations, through planning a "coup d'état" against Abbas, as well as corruption and blackmailing of senior politicians and businessmen.
Dahlan, of course, denied all accusations in his formal announcements but has been known to say among friends that the last and least person to blame him for corruption should be Abbas, whose sons are allegedly corrupt themselves. According to Palestinian sources, he even prepared a paper elaborating on his accusations and handed it to several lawyers in order to receive their feedback on the matter. Dahlan and Abbas' respective actions foreshadow a looming war of slander between the two sides.
After the raid on his home and Dahlan's immediate return to Amman, he issued a statement in which he threatened to retaliate in a most forceful manner and "destroy the house on the heads of its dwellers".
Why now and why all this ferocity? The first reason is personal. There is animosity between Dahlan and the local Tanzim leaders on the one hand, and Abbas and the entire generation of Tunisian leaders on the other, which has only grown over time. After the Gazan Tanzim fled to Ramallah as a result of Hamas' takeover, they were not welcomed by the Muqata'a, the administrative arm of the Palestinian Authority, which tried to exile them to Jericho. Immediately after the news of the reconciliation with Hamas, Abbas summoned the Tanzim to his office and told them that the time was right for their return to Gaza.
The Gazan Fatah leaders read this suggestion as a death sentence on the part of the Muqata'a. One may say that the political split between the West Bank and Gaza is not limited to Fatah-Hamas rivalry, but is, in fact, all-inclusive – the West Bankers simply do not want to see Gazans among them. This is the Palestinian expression of the widespread tribalism phenomenon in the Middle East.
On his part, Dahlan was not careful in his utterances against Abbas. He saw Abbas as a weak personality and went as far as accusing his sons of corruption. Abbas, however, perceived Dahlan's pronouncements as a liability for the Palestinian bid for statehood at the UN in September and could not tolerate Dahlan's behavior and insinuations. Abbas wished to present a calm and "peaceful" Palestinian Authority at the UN, ripe enough to become a state. This, after all, was the main motivation for the PA's reconciliation with Hamas.
Abbas never desired reconciliation for its own sake as much he wanted Hamas to keep quiet before his trip to the UN. However, Dahlan's presence and activities in Ramallah threatened to topple the September project by creating "anarchy- fawda" in the West Bank, similar to the disturbances he caused in Gaza during his leadership of Fatah in the Strip, which allegedly included bribery, intimidation, kidnapping, and even assassinations. To make matters worse, Dahlan's convoys in Ramallah matched or even overshadowed those of Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad, and signaled the presence of a new leadership.
The takeover of Dahlan's house in Ramallah over the weekend symbolized the wrongdoing the PA perceived in his behavior. They arrested his bodyguards to send the message that Dahlan could do with only one bodyguard, as any ordinary activist; confiscated two cars to notify Dahlan he could not have "convoys" like Abbas and Fayyad; and took his computers on suspicion of corruption and subversion. The PA even arrested for a brief period the symbols of Fatah's heroism in Gaza (opponents of Israel and Hamas): Abu Ali Shaheen, the leader of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, and Sufian Abu Zaida, a former inmate who later became the Palestinian minister of prisoner affairs.
Another challenge Dahlan poses to Abbas relates to the liabilities following the event at the UN in September. Abbas understands that should he pass the test of statehood in September, he will no longer be able to avoid the test of elections. Does statehood have any meaning without elections? It is the opinion of this writer that fair and honest elections are no more likely to place now than after the September vote. However, as far as Abbas is concerned, he will not be able to evade this test much longer. Dahlan, no doubt, will run and split the Fatah vote. In doing so, he will assure Hamas' victory. Dahlan, apparently, does not care.
What exacerbated concerns about future elections were the results of the elections to the bureaus of commerce currently taking place in the West Bank, and especially those in the city of Nablus, where all candidates recommended by Fatah and the Palestinian Authority failed to get elected. According to Fatah sources, popular sentiment resolved to boycott Fatah. The same sources also remarked they were relieved that Hamas, at least, was also rejected in what is seen as a popular turning away from all organizations. If this Fatah perspective is correct, which is too early to determine, it confirms that while Fatah was heavily involved in the election process, Hamas' involvement was largely limited by PA security.
