

Nuclear Proliferation and Iran: Thoughts about the Bomb

Yonatan Beker

Yonatan Beker is a foreign policy fellow at the office of US Senator Norman Coleman (R-MN), and is pursuing a graduate degree at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Prior to that, he served as communications director to the Israeli minister of transportation and foreign press adviser to the minister of justice. Mr. Beker is a member of the Israeli Bar Association.

After reading the November 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) observers quickly pronounced the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear weapons program diffused. Their pronouncement was based on the high-probability assessment that the program was halted in 2003. Less certainty, however, was given to the possibility of the program being renewed at a later date. Further concerns arise from potential transfers of "civilian" nuclear technologies and materials, such as highly enriched uranium, into an easily restarted weapons program.

The NIE thus leaves us with the distinct possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons in the coming years, with some intelligence services noting 2009 as a probable date for completion. This requires the international community to unequivocally choose between preventing this program from developing or gradually allowing it to come to fruition. Thus, a comparison of the logic behind these contrasting options is imperative. This can be done by pairing each alternative with matching theories of nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation, devised by eminent political scientists Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, respectively. Each theory's applicability to the case at hand merits comparison to Libya's recent termination of its nuclear program, and clear conclusions should be drawn about the efficacy of coercive diplomacy.

An excellent illustration of the contrasting views between those who view nuclear proliferation as a factor promoting international security and those who see it as a threat to global security is given in the running debate between Waltz and Sagan.¹

Rationality in Realist Theory

Waltz's justification for nuclear proliferation is premised upon the realist approach to the international system. According to the realist theory, states coexist in a condition of anarchy, with no government ruling over them.² It assumes statesmen

think and act only in terms of self-interest defined as power. As a result, it rejects the search for motives and ideological preferences. Political realism thus considers a rational foreign policy to be good foreign policy, since rational policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits.³ As Hans Morgenthau, a pioneer in the field of international relations theory, explained, “Realism considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue of politics.”

University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer provides an explanation for a state’s pursuit of power based on several key assumptions: there is indeed a state of anarchy in the international system; great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability; and states can never be certain of each other’s intentions. However, it is imperative that the rival knows the capabilities of the intended target. If the rival has destructive capabilities in the form of nuclear weapons, aggressive tendencies will be significantly reduced. Mearsheimer echoes Morgenthau’s assertion that great powers are rational actors that are aware of their external environment and think strategically about how to survive in it. Thus, another assumption is that survival is the primary goal of great powers. What results from these assumptions are three general patterns of behavior: fear, power maximization, and self-help.

Rational Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation—The Waltz Approach

Self-help is seen by Waltz as the key principle of action in an anarchic order, and the most important way in which states help themselves is by providing for their own security.⁴ Security can be achieved through defensive posture or deterrence. “The defensive ideal” calls for building defenses that appear strong enough so as to prevent anyone from even trying to overcome them. Unfortunately, in the nuclear age this seems an unattainable goal since no set of fortifications could limit the impact of a nuclear offensive. The alternative to the defensive ideal is to build retaliatory forces promising a counterstrike of such magnitude so as to deter an attack from ever taking place.

Deterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish. It therefore stands to reason that in an asymmetric balance of nuclear power, the state without nuclear weapons lacks the defensive ability to prevent a nuclear attack, while the nuclear state possesses the ultimate deterrent against conventional threats. This reality exists between Israel and its rivals. Although Israel maintains a policy of ambiguity regarding its nuclear capabilities, the mere suspicion that Israel possesses them deters conventional attacks from its state rivals. The Arab world cannot risk staging an all-out war for fear of a non-conventional

retaliation. This non-conventional imbalance is thought to be a primary catalyst for past and present nuclear programs in the Middle East.

Waltz states that a second-strike capability promotes rational deterrence. A second-strike capability means the ability to launch a retaliatory strike even after a state is subjected to a nuclear attack. The retaliation would be of such magnitude so as to dissuade an aggressor from initiating a nuclear strike. Achieving second-strike capability almost guarantees, according to Waltz, that war is unlikely due to mutually assured destruction.⁵ Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) is credited with preventing nuclear exchanges during the Cold War.

Beyond merely asserting that MAD prevents nuclear war, Waltz declares that nuclear weapons decrease the chance and scale of conventional wars as well. He argues that if states can score only small gains when large ones risk retaliation, they have little incentive to fight. Moreover, nuclear weapons negate the advantages of conventional superiority because escalation in the use of conventional force risks a nuclear strike. The face-off—and stand-down—during the Cuban missile crisis, is a remarkable example of such prudence and restraint.

As to the risk of transfers of nuclear weapons and materials into terrorists' hands, seemingly independent of a state, Waltz reasons that since the risks of retaliation are so high, nuclear states will prevent any such connection from taking place, fearing the materials would be traced back to them.

Waltz sums up his argument thus:

In a nuclear world only limited wars can be fought. In a conventional world, states are tempted to strike first to gain an initial advantage... In a nuclear world, to strike first is pointless because no advantage can be gained against invulnerable forces... Nuclear weapons lessen the intensity as well as the frequency of war among their possessors.⁶

The Sagan Objection to Nonproliferation—An Organizational Approach

If one expects this logic to hold true, then the spread of nuclear weapons should not only be condoned but actively promoted as the harbinger and guarantor of international security. Yet, an international consensus still views nuclear proliferation as an extreme threat to world peace. Scott Sagan proposes a theory to match that sentiment in response to rational deterrence.⁸

His alternative—rooted in organization theory—is based on two central arguments. First, military organizations—because of common biases, inflexible routines and parochial interests—display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to

deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war. Second, future nuclear states will lack the positive mechanisms of civilian control. Before exploring Sagan's theory, however, we must review his reasons for the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Why Do States Go Nuclear?⁹

Sagan challenges the notion that nuclear weapons are pursued only when states face a significant security threat. Nuclear weapons are more than simply national security tools: They also serve as political objects in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles, and as international symbols of modernity and prestige. These additional motives go beyond the primary drive of achieving security, and therefore cast a doubt over the reasoning offered by Waltz and the "proliferation optimists" (in Sagan's terms). This doubt encompasses both the rationality supposedly possessed by decision makers in nuclear states, and the security assurances labeled by Waltz as the central tenets of stability in a nuclear world.

Sagan believes three models represent the full spectrum of motives for pursuing nuclear weapons: "The security model" — the cornerstone of Waltz's reasoning; "the norms model," which examines nuclear symbolism and state identity; and finally "the domestic politics" model, which focuses on the domestic actors who encourage or discourage governments from pursuing the bomb. These actors are: the state's nuclear energy establishment; important units within the professional military (in Iran, these would be the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, responsible for the country's WMD programs);¹⁰ and politicians in states in which political parties or the public strongly favor nuclear weapons acquisition. Bureaucratic actors do not passively receive political decisions, but actively create the conditions that favor weapons development by encouraging extreme perceptions of foreign threats, and lobbying for increased defense spending. While realists concede these actors have parochial interests, they are given marginal significance. To this Sagan responds: "Nuclear weapons programs are not obvious or inevitable solutions to international security problems; instead (they) are solutions looking for a problem to which to attach themselves so as to justify their existence."

Several examples go a long way toward validating this model. In the Indian case, the strong parochial interests of the scientific community, as well as political motives, led Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to decide to test a nuclear device, unbeknownst to senior defense officials or the foreign minister. In South Africa, it was not a change in the security environment, but rather major internal political changes that led to the abandonment of the nuclear program. In South America during the 1980s, Argentina and Brazil shifted from nuclear competition to cooperative restraint, brought about by the emergence of liberalizing regimes that chose

market-driven economic interests over a wasteful and unproductive nuclear weapons program.

It thus becomes clear that history validates Sagan's claim that nuclear proliferation and nuclear restraint occur for more than simply one reason.¹¹ Relying solely on the security model to rationalize and attempt to solve the Iranian case neglects crucial components of the analysis. Additional models are needed because of the empirical inconsistencies of the security model.

First, the model's proponents rely on statements given by decision makers who have a vested interest in justifying their choices as serving the national interest. These statements often do not reflect the true motives behind such decisions. Another problem is relying on a time correlation between the emergence of a security threat and the decision to develop nuclear weapons. This suggests that proliferation comes in pairs, i.e., one state responding to the armament of another. Our case fails to fall into that category, since Iran's chief rival (Iraq) was effectively dismantled and disarmed in the 2003 war. If Iran's rival is thought to be Israel (even though the two states never fought each other directly), it allegedly became nuclear decades before the post-revolutionary nuclear program. Indeed, the Shah's nuclear program was not meant to counter Israeli strength—Israel was allied with the Shah—but to establish regional hegemony and prestige. The justification for Iran's second nuclear program was primarily a response to Iraq's non-conventional threat.

Proliferation—Why Not?

Sagan proceeds to critique the three operational requirements sustaining the rational deterrence framework: avoiding a preventive war initiated by a nuclear state against a non-nuclear state pursuing a weapon; both sides attaining second-strike survivability; and a nuclear arsenal not prone to accidental or unauthorized use.

Waltz points to the possibility of an effective preventive strike taking place against an early-stage nuclear program, but adds that such an attack would not take place against a state with an advanced program. Sagan ascribes to preventive strikes a higher probability for the following reasons: the focus on warfare makes military officers skeptical of non-military alternatives, believing in "better-now-than-never" logic; these officers possess biases in favor of offensive measures and decisive operations, over debilitating diplomatic consideration. Whenever the US and the USSR contemplated preventive strikes against nuclear programs, these strikes were invariably proposed by defense officials and rejected by their civilian superiors. Preventive strikes were employed only twice: against the Iraqi nuclear

reactor in 1981 and against the Syrian–Korean plutonium reactor in September 2007. These precedents—seemingly successful in reversing nuclear programs—indicate a similar action may be taken against Iran as well.¹²

As to the second requirement for rational deterrence, Sagan reminds us that rather than settling—as Waltz predicts—on a limited second-strike capability, comprised of a small amount of invulnerable nuclear devices, the US and USSR amassed enormous arsenals capable of sending our planet back to the Stone Age.¹³ Sagan explains this contradiction by the continuous pressure applied by military and scientific organizations on decision makers to continue expanding the arsenal.

The final requirement for rational deterrence is that nuclear arsenals should not be prone to accidental or unauthorized use. This requirement falters, however, when one considers the lower priority placed on costly safety procedures, as opposed to more parochial objectives such as increasing production levels. New nuclear states could lack the organizational and financial resources needed to guarantee safety, and the secretive nature of these programs exacerbates such concerns, as was the case with Chernobyl. An additional risk arises when a survival-fearing leadership delegates launch authority to lower levels in the defense hierarchy, as was thought to be the case in Iraq in 1991.

As to the policy implications of his organizational approach, Sagan declares that the US should maintain its traditional nonproliferation policy: Potential new nuclear weapon states should be persuaded that it is in their interest to prevent the proliferation. They could be reminded that they would become targets of preventive attacks; would not be able to easily develop survivable arsenals; and will raise the probability of accidental or unauthorized use. Sagan warns all observers of the Cold War's "nuclear peace" not to deduce that such would always be the case in nuclear face-offs: "This should be a cause of celebration and wonder; it should not be an excuse for inaction with either arms control or nonproliferation."

Sagan's work is a well-argued alternative to the narrow viewpoint offered by Waltz. States considering nuclear programs face various considerations beyond the security imperative. We cannot ignore examples of countries that were in a similar position to Iran, i.e., facing the choice to continue or halt a clandestine weapons program. These countries rejected the potential benefits of a nuclear program for the superior benefits of abstaining from it. Remarkably, of the forty countries that are, or were, able to acquire nuclear weapons, only nine possess these weapons today.

Iran – The Tenth Atomic State?

This brings us to our case in point and to the question of whether or not Iran should be allowed to develop nuclear weapons, and what, if anything, the international community should do to prevent that from happening. The NIE helps broaden that question. Rather than focus on the progression or halting of a weapons program, we can assume for the sake of this argument that Iran is currently engaged in a nuclear energy development program, but that under certain circumstances it may resume its weapons program, using its highly enriched uranium for nuclear devices.

The NIE led commentators to state that the fact that Iran halted its program in 2003 proves it is led by a rational regime, capable of prudently weighing the costs and benefits of such a critical decision. This decision was likely made because of the regime's recognition of a dramatic shift in US policy, and the enhanced probability that the program, and perhaps the regime itself, could be targeted by the US. The report indicates that the decision to halt the program was made in the fall of 2003, just after the US invaded Iraq and dismantled its totalitarian regime. While the invasion eliminated Iran's greatest threat, it appears Iran was unwilling to risk an attack on its soil if its clandestine program were to be discovered. It seems the close presence of a formidable US force entered into the survivability considerations of the regime, named by President George W. Bush as a member of the "Axis of Evil."

A similar decision was made around that time by another rogue regime: Muammar Qadhafi's Libya. On December 19, 2003, Libya not only revealed its clandestine nuclear weapons program, but also agreed to dismantle it. It appears that after recognizing the US policy shift, Qadhafi "preempted" further isolation and perhaps a preventive strike against him and chose to accept a deal offering him incentives in exchange for dismantling the program. This successful precedent is a fine example of the "carrot and stick" approach of promoting nonproliferation: using a combination of incentives for compliance, and threats in cases of noncompliance, to persuade states with nuclear ambitions to dismantle their programs.

North Korea is yet another example of this policy. Negotiations with North Korea achieved apparent success in June 2008 when it publicly dismantled the cooling tower in the infamous Yungbyun nuclear facility, and submitted a sixty-page declaration detailing its nuclear activities. In return, North Korea was removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list, sanctions against it will eventually be rescinded and other economic incentives will gradually be provided.

Is Coercive Diplomacy the Answer?—The Libyan Example

The Libyan case is seen as the prime example for the successful implementation of a “coercive diplomacy” strategy. In “Who ‘Won’ Libya?” Jentleson and Whytock explore the evolution of this policy and view its final stage—applied between 1999–2003—as a successful tool in achieving nonproliferation of rogue regimes.¹⁴ The strategy of coercion is most likely to succeed “if the costs of noncompliance it can impose on, and the benefits of compliance it can offer to, the target state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance and costs of compliance.”

To ensure success, the strategy must meet three key criteria. First, it must exhibit proportionality between the objectives pursued and the instruments used in their pursuit. Second, it must contain reciprocity, i.e., an understanding of linkage between the coercer’s carrots and the target’s concessions. Lastly, it must maintain coercive credibility. The coercer state must convincingly convey that noncompliance has consequences. Also required is support among major international actors and lack of substantial opposition within the coerced state.

A variety of domestic political and economic conditions should be analyzed to see how they will influence the target state’s assessment of the costs and benefits of compliance versus noncompliance. In Iran, for example, the following variables would be weighed: regime survivability; the tug-of-war between the clerical leadership and the scientific and defense establishments; the level of support or opposition to the program in the street; vulnerability to economic sanctions versus control over significant energy resources; and regime prestige in domestic and regional arenas.

Coercive diplomacy toward Libya was successfully implemented as follows: First, credibility was achieved mostly due to the demonstration of US determination to prevent WMD proliferation among rogue regimes (Qadhafi made his announcement six days after the capture of Saddam Hussein), but also due to the credibility of the sanctions mechanism. UN sanctions provided greater legitimacy and greater economic impact. The second component of the strategy—proportionality between means and ends—was upheld when the coercers “settled” for policy change instead of regime change. The message to the Libyans was clear: they would not suffer the fate of the Iraqi regime should they comply. Finally, reciprocity was insisted upon during the entire process: Incentives were given only after concessions were made by the Libyans. Such was the case after the Libyans extradited the suspects in the Pan Am Lockerbie bombing,¹⁵ after Libya renounced terrorism and barred it from its borders; and of course after Libya abolished its nuclear program.

Will Coercive Diplomacy Work Again?

Can this seemingly successful strategy apply to the Iranian case? Coercive diplomacy (or force-diplomacy) is only seemingly successful, because its success may not always be duplicated to other cases. Jentleson and Whytock mention Alexander George's caveat on applying theory based on past cases to policy aimed at current ones: any cross-case comparisons must be "actor specific," i.e., drawing similarities between two cases while emphasizing the differences between them.¹⁶ Applying that advice, the authors devised policy prescriptions suitable for any policy puzzle.

First, there is greater potential complementarity between force and diplomacy than advocates of one or the other tend to convey. This is a crucial point, particularly following the NIE, since the report presents an opportunity to combine the efforts of force and diplomacy, at a point in time in which the imperative for immediate military measures supposedly subsided. Rather than placing all the policy "eggs" in one "basket," i.e., the basket of diplomatic measures versus forceful measures, the international community must display the resolve to combine the two, as warranted, throughout the negotiation process.

The second conclusion is that rogue regimes are reformable. The Qadhafi regime showed it was capable of making a major policy shift after facing a resolute international community and a favorable calculation of costs and benefits. The regime's primary instinct—survivability—militates in favor of compliance. While it had not declared so, the Iranian regime appeared to have made such a shift in late 2003, when it halted its program. It is perhaps not a coincidence that this decision has been made in tandem with the Libyan decision. Once again, Iran seemingly displayed rational thought and survivability-oriented prudence.

A third conclusion is that pursuing regime change can be counterproductive to achieving policy success. Good results could be achieved once the regime change option is removed from the table. Those in favor of regime change justify this by saying that keeping that option on the table enhances leverage and coercive pressure. Although the US is certainly displeased with the Iranian regime and would like to see its removal, Washington does not appear to be actively pursuing a strategy aimed at pursuing that goal (symbolic support for subversive movements notwithstanding). It would therefore not damage US posture to declare that Washington would not seek to change the regime, but instead would focus on changing the regime's policy.

Fourth, economic sanctions can, and should, be an effective component of the strategy when imposed multilaterally and sustained over time. The sanctions

imposed on Libya achieved mixed results until an escalation of economic pressure aided in bringing Tripoli to its senses. Iran is a much wealthier country, thus less susceptible to rudimentary sanctions. In the past year, however, the UN Security Council implemented an escalatory system wherein Iranian noncompliance results in harsher measures. To date, three rounds of sanctions were initiated, in addition to recently imposed EU sanctions and robust American economic measures. Consistent adherence to this process may yield sufficient pressure, bringing Iran to increased compliance.

The final conclusion relates to the degree in which multilateral support was given to promote the objectives of coercive diplomacy. The failure of the early stages of force-diplomacy toward Libya is explained in the lack of US–European cooperation. The success of these efforts was achieved after they joined diplomatic forces and extracted concessions from the Libyans, using the legitimacy of Security Council sanctions. One could therefore argue that following the Security Council resolutions, Iran now has to answer to the international community as a whole, relieving the US of the burden of acting alone.

Conclusion—Iran at the Crossroads

As a pluralistic society, the US continues to entertain a variety of policy options. Nevertheless, these options would continue to be drawn from a basket corresponding to its traditional policy of nonproliferation. It is unlikely that either a McCain or Obama administration would reverse that policy and embrace Waltz's vision of a nuclear but stable world. The US will continue to promote policies that prevent rogue regimes such as Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. For the best course of action to match this policy, the US should continue to employ a strategy of coercive diplomacy. That strategy proved successful in the Libyan case, and seemed to bear fruit in the Iranian case—if, indeed, it can be proven that Tehran halted its weapons program in 2003 and has not resumed it since. The escalating process built into the sanctions regime should allow the Iranians to see a horizon in which these sanctions and the regime's isolation would be removed, in return for the suspension of uranium enrichment and the clearing of suspicions. In addition to other incentives yet to be offered, the promise of such a horizon should bring a rational Iranian regime to compliance.

The Iranian regime holds the key to solving this puzzle. For years it developed a nuclear weapons program hidden from the international community. Justifying its nuclear research by a questionable need for nuclear energy to supplement its abundant energy resources, Iran deceived the international community and brought itself perilously close to a preventive strike, or even a regime change.¹⁷

In 2003 the Iranian regime—perhaps after recognizing this threat—brought itself to halt that secret program. It also increased its participation in the negotiation process. However, the good faith engendered by this was quickly replaced by staunch stubbornness, delay and deceit tactics, and belligerent rhetoric issued by its new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. By breaching an agreement with the EU-3, by attacking the US on every public stage, by threatening Israel with destruction and by violating IAEA norms and regulations, Ahmadinejad led his country to further isolation and sanctions. Iran could continue to walk the path of the rogue state and visit upon itself all manner of economic and military pressure, or take the course followed successfully by Libya, and apparently by North Korea as well.

Waltz was incorrect in assuming that only the security imperative determines a state's decision to acquire nuclear weapons. As Sagan correctly explained, and as the Libyan precedent illustrates, a rational player weighs multiple variables and reaches decisions after calculating the costs and benefits of a proposed policy. The regime in Tehran needs to make these calculations sooner rather than later. Indeed, its very survival could depend on it.

Notes

- ¹ Scott D. Sagan, Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, New Edition (New York, 1995, 2003).
- ² John Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power," in Robert C. Art and Robert Jervis, *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, Seventh Edition (New York, 2005).
- ³ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Six Principles of Political Realism," in Art & Jervis op. cit.
- ⁴ Waltz, "More May Be Better," in Sagan and Waltz, op.cit., p. 4.
- ⁵ Tanya Ogilvie-White, "Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate," *The Nonproliferation Review* (Fall 1996), 45.
- ⁶ Waltz, op. cit.
- ⁷ See the publicized opinion piece and ensuing campaign led by former and current US officials George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," the *Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 2007, and the response of Harold Brown and John Deutsch, "The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 19, 2007.
- ⁸ Sagan, "More Will Be Worse," in Sagan and Waltz, op. cit., p. 46.
- ⁹ For a compelling categorization of the "drivers and barriers" to nuclear proliferation see: Joseph Cirincione, *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons* (New York, 2007).
- ¹⁰ Daniel L. Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Jerrold Green, *Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era* (Santa Monica, CA, 2001), p. 40.

- ¹¹ Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security*, XXI: 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), 54–86.
- ¹² See: Robert Zelnick, "The Iran Factor, the Sunni States, and the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict," available on the Hoover Institute website at www.hoover.org/bios/zelnick.html.
- ¹³ See: Richard Rhodes, *Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race* (New York, 2007).
- ¹⁴ Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, "Who 'Won' Libya?: The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," *International Security*, XXX: 3 (Winter 2005/06), 47–86.
- ¹⁵ See James P. Kreindler, "The Lockerbie Case and Its Implications for State-Sponsored Terrorism," *The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* I:2, (2007).
- ¹⁶ Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington DC, 1993), pp. 117–118, 130–131, 137–138.
- ¹⁷ The Iranian nuclear program is perhaps more vulnerable than some would speculate. For an assessment of the Israeli "preventive" capabilities, see: Whitney Raas and Austin Long, "Osirak Redux?: Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities," *International Security*, XXXI: 4 (Spring 2007), 7–33.



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